I. INTRODUCTION
UTURE distribution systems are envisioned including a considerable amount of distributed generation (DG), operating in a looped/meshed network configuration and freely switching between grid-connected (GC) and islanded (ISL) mode. Among others, advanced protection schemes are needed to permit such a complex distribution system operation. The benefits gained by DG producers and system operators [1] justify the considerable investment required for this purpose.
Determining proper relay settings is a challenging task. In fact, besides technical reasons, a common cause of protection maloperation is incorrect relay setting [2] . Even in conventional overhead (OH) radial distribution systems, setting the main line relay(s) requires a cumbersome simulation study, mainly due to the need for coordination with lateral protection means. Obviously, the difficulty increases considerably in looped/meshed distribution networks with DG, due to the increased network's complexity and the need for frequent relay setting revisions, given the continuous expected changes (e.g. connection of new DG units). Hence, it becomes a necessity to
The research work was supported by the Hellenic Foundation for Research and Innovation (HFRI) and the General Secretariat for Research and Technology (GSRT), under the HFRI PhD Fellowship grant (GA. no. 19773 investigate reliable protection concepts, which eliminate the need for simulation-based user-determined settings, being, as far as possible, independent of a specific network. Distribution system particularities (e.g. existence of laterals) and existing relay capabilities should also be considered. To the best of the authors' knowledge, so far, papers focusing on protection of looped/meshed distribution systems have not addressed a "leave-and-forget" concept including all the above attributes.
Recently proposed directional-overcurrent-based [3] - [5] and distance-based [6] , [7] protection schemes for looped or meshed distribution systems require proper relay settings, depending on the specific network to protect. Although applying differential protection could simplify this process [3] , [8] , [9] , proper relay setting is still required, especially when loads and/or DG units are connected within the protection zone. Moreover, a drawback of line differential protection is the inability of inherently providing backup protection for adjacent laterals outside the primary protection zone [6] . Optimization algorithms have been also proposed for relay setting [10] - [12] , which, however, produce settings suitable only for the specific network and system conditions considered.
Recent research efforts also examine alternative protection solutions for looped/meshed distribution networks, although they are not based on common commercial relay functions. Within this context, protection techniques applying datamining [13] , [14] , machine learning [15] and deep neural networks [16] have been proposed among others, which, however, require a training process, based on scenarios of the specific network examined. Other, recently proposed, protection techniques include dynamic-state-estimation-based protection [17] , checking power direction of the positive-sequence fault component [18] and interval type-2 fuzzy logic [19] . In the latter, as well as in the above papers of this paragraph, backup protection of laterals and coordination of main line protection with common lateral protection means is not addressed. To eliminate protection system design complexity in modern OH distribution systems, ensuring protection reliability, a plug-and-play (PnP) protection solution is investigated in this work. The main contributions of the latter are the following:  The PnP relays do not require user-determined settings, typically resulting from a simulation study.  The protection scheme is independent of a specific OH distribution system and immune to planned or unplanned system changes, such as switch between GC and ISL mode, connection/disconnection of DG units or line segments etc. Hence, the need for future setting revisions is eliminated, while, applying adaptive logic is not needed. F  The proposed scheme is efficient against faults of any type and location, even ground faults with high resistance.  The main line PnP relays operate selectively with each other and with the existing lateral protection means (even non-settable fuses), without needing a coordination study.  The PnP relays are designed based on existing relay capabilities, thus, the proposed solution is directly applicable. This paper is organized as follows. The basic logic of the proposed scheme and its design using PnP relays is described in Section II and III, respectively, while, its performance is evaluated in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. BASIC LOGIC OF THE PROTECTION SCHEME
The PnP protection scheme is basically described via Fig.  1 , showing a part of a generic OH meshed distribution system. Note that the scheme's logic, addressed below, ensures isolation of the faulted line part, even if the network-loop is open.
A. Main Line Segment Protection
Each main line segment Li,j, connecting buses Bi and Bj, is protected by two PnP, communication-assisted, multifunctional, numerical relays Ri,j and Rj,i, installed at its opponent ends, which supervise for forward faults (i.e. fault currents flowing into Li,j). To timely avoid undesired trips for forward faults outside Li,j, each of Ri,j and Rj,i sends a blocking signal (signals bf in Fig. 1 ) to the forward element of its opponent relay, immediately after detecting a probable fault situation. Only if, after processing, this situation is found to be a forward fault or not an actual fault, bf-signal is cancelled, and the opponent relay is let trip its circuit breaker (CBi,j and CBj,i, respectively). To ensure fault clearance, once a relay trips its CB, it intertrips the opponent CB as well.
B. Bus Protection
For bus protection, we exploit the already installed adjacent relays. For instance, bus Bi in Fig. 1 is protected by Ri,j, Ri,h and Ri,l, which, besides supervising for forward faults to protect Li,j, Lh,i and Li,l, respectively, they also supervise for reverse faults to protect Bi. These relays are assumed forming a group of relays GRi. To enhance protection security as previously, each GRi-relay sends a blocking signal (signals br in Fig. 1 ) to the reverse element of the rest GRi-relays, immediately after detecting a probable fault situation. If, ultimately, this situation is found to be a reverse fault or not an actual fault, br-signal is cancelled. Hence, the rest GRi-relays are let trip their assigned CB. In this case too, once a GRi-relay trips its CB, it also inter-trips the CBs of the rest GRi-relays (CBi).
C. Lateral Protection
Each lateral Li is primarily protected by the protection means Pi installed at its departure. Pi is usually a fuse, due to its relatively low cost, and, less often, a conventional overcurrent relay. In this scheme, existing Pi is maintained, so as to avoid Pi-replacement cost. We also assume that Pi always coordinates with its downstream protection means. Li is secondarily protected by the GRi-relays, which also serve as backup protection for Li, following the same logic as that of Bi protection. As such, GRi-relays have to coordinate with Pi as well. 
III. DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED PLUG-AND-PLAY RELAY
The functional logic of the designed PnP relays is described for a relay Ri,j (Fig. 2 ). Α dedicated element is designed against three-phase (3PH), double-phase (2PH), and ground (doublephase-ground (2PHG) and single-line-ground (SLG)) faults.
A. Ground (SLG/2PHG)-Fault Protection Element 1) Starting
To initiate the ground-fault protection element, preserving adequate sensitivity, an overcurrent starting function based on superimposed quantities is used. In general, the superimposed quantity ns, of a quantity n at instant t, is calculated as [20] :
where k is an integer (here k = 3) and T is an 1-cycle period. ns reflects a change in n and equals (almost) zero under pre-fault conditions, while, it gives the pure fault signal during a fault.
The starting function of the ground-fault protection element asserts ( Fig. 2 ) when the magnitude of the superimposed zerosequence current (I0,s) satisfies the following condition:
where In is the nominal current of the relay's current transformer (CT) and 5%In is a typical maximum current sensitivity, adopted by several commercial relays (e.g. [21] ). Assuming a full-cycle Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) filter, reliable enough signals are obtained 1 cycle after the initiation. Hence, the overall starting time tS is equal to:
where tD is the time needed for the starting condition to become valid, after fault inception. All the signals used in the algorithm-steps 2) and 3), described next, are those measured/calculated at t = tS. Note that once (2) becomes valid, bfi,j and bri,j are sent to block the forward operation of Rj,i and the reverse operation of the rest GRi-relays, respectively.
2) Phase selection (PS)
Next, the fault type/faulted phase is determined by examining the phase-angle relationship between the superimposed negative-( 2,s I ) and positive-sequence ( 1, s I ) current phasors (hereafter referred to as I2,s vs. I1,s principle), as well as that between the negative-and zero-sequence ( 0,s I ) current phasors (hereafter referred to as I2,s vs. I0,s principle). The above principles are applicable to commercial relays and are considered reliable under various fault/system conditions [22] , [23] . [23] , [24] . For security, both PS principles must agree on the fault-type for the latter to be specified. In that way, we also achieve fault-type distinction in I2,s vs. I0,s (e.g. 90 o < φΙs,20 < 150 o could mean either a-b-g or c-g fault). Some commercial relays switch to sequence-voltage-based PS, if sequence-current-based PS fails [23] . In this work, if sequence-current-based PS fails, PS patterns [25] based on the actually measured sequence-voltage phasors are applied (see Fig. 2 ), which, in fact, are reliable (among others) in microgrids, even including photovoltaic (PV) units. To this end, Table I also gives the range of phase-angle difference φV,21 between the negative-( 2 V ) and positive-sequence ( 1 V ) voltage phasors, as well as that of phase-angle difference φV,20 between the negative-and zero-sequence ( 0 V ) voltage phasors, each indicating a specific fault type. Hereafter, these principles are referred to as V2 vs. V1 and V2 vs. V0, respectively. Note that V2 vs. V0 is used against ground faults, whereas, V2 vs. V1 is used against 2PH faults (described later). To discriminate between a SLG and a 2PHG fault when using V2 vs. V0 (e.g. 30 o < φV,20 < 150 o could mean either a-b-g or c-g fault), voltage drop in each phase (ΔUa, ΔUb and ΔUc) is examined. For instance, in the above example, if both ΔUa > ΔUc and ΔUb > ΔUc hold, a-b-g fault is specified, whereas, c-g fault is determined if both ΔUc > ΔUa and ΔUc > ΔUb hold.
3) Fault direction determination
After a specific fault type is specified (indicated by a signal ft in Fig. 2 ), the fault direction is determined using a distance element. After receiving signal ft, the distance element calculates the impedance angle θl corresponding to the fault loop l (out of six) involved in the fault (see basic-calculations block in Fig. 2 ). The impedance angle of a phase-(e.g. a-b) and a ground-fault loop (e.g. a-g) is, respectively, equal to: voltage, superimposed phase-a current and superimposed phase-b current phasors, respectively, measured by the relay, and 0 K is the zero-sequence compensation factor [22] . Note that superimposed currents are used for θl calculation, to keep the latter uninfluenced by the pre-fault load. If the voltage of the faulted loop is not adequate (e.g. in case of close-in unbalanced faults), the voltage of the healthy phases is used [22] . Also note that setting 0 K accurately, based on the impedance of the protected line, is important in multi-zone distance protection applications [26] , where discrimination between distance zones must be ensured. However, since the distance element is here used for fault direction determination only (not using distance zones), absolute 0 K setting accuracy is not required and a value based on the impedance of a typical medium-voltage (MV) OH line [22] can be applied by default.
In principle, the calculated faulted-loop impedance lies in the first quadrant of the complex impedance (R-X) plane during a forward fault and in the third quadrant during a reverse fault [22] . However, intermediate infeeds and fault resistance can cause underreach or overreach of the distance element (see Fig. 3a ). Since overreach can even lead to angle θl lying in the fourth quadrant [ 
4) Trip decision
If (5) holds (forward fault), a signal cf is generated (see Fig.  2 ) to cancel signal bfi,j, blocking the forward operation of Rj,i. If the respective signal bfj,i from Rj,i is not active, Ri,j trips CBi,j. If (6) holds (reverse fault), a signal cr is generated (see Fig. 2 ) to cancel signal bri,j, blocking the reverse operation of the rest GRi-relays. If the blocking signals from the rest GRi-relays (shown as a single signal bri in Fig. 2 ) are not active, Ri,j sends a signal sg to the reverse-fault block (RFB) (see Fig. 2 ). RFB, described in detail later, discriminates between a reverse fault at bus Bi and a reverse fault in lateral Li, and, in the latter case, ensures coordination between GRi-relays and Pi.
Since, after tS expires, any signal bfj,i (resp. signals bri), sent by Rj,i (resp. GRi-relays), must be cancelled by the transmitting relay(s) for a trip to be issued (resp. for a signal sg to be sent), the tripping time tTF of Ri,j during a forward fault in Li,j (resp. the time tSR to send sg during a reverse fault in Bi/Li) will be:
where tSO is the starting time of Rj,i and tS,1, tS,2,…., tS,NR are the starting times of the rest GRi-relays (NR in total). Note that, assuming a fast means, communication latency can be considered negligible (e.g. it equals 4.9 μs/km for fiber optic cable).
B. 2PH-Fault Protection Element 1) Starting
Current unbalance (iu) is applied as starting criterion for the 2PH-fault protection element. The most accurate definition of iu is [27] : 21 iu I I  
where I1 and I2 is the magnitude of the actual positive-and negative-sequence current, respectively, measured by the relay. The greatest expected iu under normal load conditions is 0.3 [27] , adopted here as the default starting setting (Fig. 2) . A signal p must be also active in order for the 2PH-fault protection element to start, which is generated as long as adequate I0,s is absent (see Fig. 2 ). In this way, any overlaps between specifying 2PH and SLG faults are avoided, especially when applying V2 vs. V1 in the next step (also see Table I ).
The overall starting time is given by (3) in this case too, while, once (8) becomes valid and p is active, bfi,j and bri,j are generated, similarly to the previous element (see Fig. 2 ).
2) Phase selection (PS)
For PS, I2,s vs. I1,s, as well as V2 vs. V1 (if I2,s vs. I1,s fails), described previously, are applied.
The logic of fault direction determination and trip decision (steps 3) and 4), respectively) is similar to that of the previous element. Note that if a reverse fault is determined and any signals bri are not active, a signal sp1 is sent to RFB (Fig. 2) .
C. 3PH-Fault Protection Element 1) Starting
Since a balanced fault occurs, the following condition must hold so as for the 3PH-fault protection element to start: 
where Ia,s, Ib,s and Ic,s is the magnitude of the superimposed phase-a, phase-b and phase-c current, respectively. The overall starting time is given by (3) . Once (9) asserts, bfi,j and bri,j are generated, as in the previous elements (Fig. 2) .
2) Fault direction determination
Since 3PH faults are balanced, PS is not applied. Instead, it is directly checked whether all the angles θl of the six fault loops (θl,tot) satisfy (5) (forward fault) or (6) (reverse fault). Except for indicating fault direction, fulfilling one of these conditions, along with (9), could signify a 3PH fault. If, during close-in 3PH faults, fault-loops voltage is not adequate, the pre-fault (memorized) voltage is used [22] to calculate θl,tot.
3) Trip decision
The trip-decision logic is similar to that of the previous elements. Note that if a reverse fault is determined and any signals bri are not active, a signal sp2 is sent to RFB (Fig. 2) .
Theoretically, the fulfillment of (9) and (5) or (6) (by θl,tot) could be also due to load rise. However, since load in a segment Li,j is unidirectional, a load rise will not be seen as a forward 3PH fault by one of the two relays protecting Li,j. Hence, this relay will not cancel the bf-signal sent to its opponent relay (which sees a 3PH fault), avoiding incorrect tripping. In contrast, a load rise could theoretically "mislead" GRi-relays into seeing a reverse 3PH fault. This is dealt with by RFB.
Finally, in the three elements described above, cf/cr can be generated not only in the trip-decision step, but also if, in any step, it is realized that an actual fault has not occurred (Fig. 2) .
D. Reverse-Fault Block (RFB)
The magnitudes of the actual phase currents (IPi,a, IPi,b, IPi,c) at Pi location are continuously monitored by Ri,j through a CT and the maximum magnitude IPi,max is extracted (see basic-calculations block in Fig. 2) . RFB is mainly based on an overcurrent (51) element, mapping IPi,max onto the time-overcurrent characteristic (TOCPi) of Pi (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3b ). If Pi is a fuse (resp. an overcurrent relay), its total-clearing (resp. tripping) characteristic is taken as TOCPi. The latter is uploaded to each GRi-relay and is the only information inserted by the user. Note, however, that this is a simple and effortless task.
1) Delayed backup operation
IPi,max would actually melt/trip Pi during a Li-fault. In the first place, a Li-fault is recognized when:
where IPi,MI is the minimum intersecting current of TOCPi.
Since sg, sp1, or sp2 must also be sent to initiate the timer of 51-element (Fig. 2) , Ri,j will be ultimately ready to trip after:
where tPi is the operating time of Pi according to the respective TOCPi and CTI is a default coordination time interval, taken equal to 0.3 s (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3b ).
If, after tTR expires, (10) still holds, it means that Pi failed to blow/trip, so Ri,j trips CBi,j, acting as backup protection. Of course, the rest GRi-relays operate similarly.
2) Instantaneous primary operation
If IPi,max < IPi,MI holds, this could mean either that: i) A fault has not occurred at Bi or Li (non or external fault). ii) A fault has occurred at Bi. iii) A high-resistance (ground) fault, not detectable by Pi, has occurred in Li. iv) A remote fault, not detectable by Pi, has occurred at the secondary side of a distribution transformer of Li. Case-i is excluded if a signal sg, sp1, or sp2 is sent. It is also desirable that GRi-relays not trip in case-iv (addressed later).
To recognize case-ii and case-iii faults in a simple way, an undervoltage (27) where Va, Vb, Vc are the magnitudes of the Bi phase voltages and 0.9 per unit (p.u.) is the voltage limit indicating an undervoltage disturbance [27] . Two cases are examined:
 If 27-element asserts and sg, sp1, or sp2 is generated as well, then (since it is known that IPi,max < IPi,MI), a Bi-fault is recognized (case-ii) and the relay trips instantaneously.
 If IPi,max < IPi,MI holds, 27-element does not assert, but a signal sg is generated, then, a high-resistance (ground) fault has expectedly occurred at Bi (case-ii) or Li (caseiii), so the relay trips again instantaneously.
3) Protection reliability aspects
In the special case where sp2 is due to a load rise, neither (10) nor (12) should hold, so RFB will not trip undesirably.
Assuming distribution transformers which are not doubleside grounded (as it is usually the case in many countries), a ground fault in the low-voltage (LV) network (case-iv) will not be detected by the ground-fault protection element, due to zero-sequence current (I0) absence, avoiding undesired RFB trip. The same also holds in case of load unbalances, given the negligible capacitance of OH distribution lines.
However, even if double-side-grounded distribution transformers are connected to Li, this can be addressed by the ven-dor/user of the PnP relay, by disabling the part of RFB shown in Fig. 2 into the dashed frame. Hence, the generation of a sgsignal alone is no longer enough for a trip to be issued (since now it could theoretically be due to a change in an unbalanced load or a LV ground fault), but either (10) or (12) must also hold. To detect high-resistance bus faults in that case, sggeneration in combination with the non-detection of a forward ground fault at Pi location could be used as a signature. Also, only in that case, high-resistance faults in Li are recognized by RFB as long as (10) holds. Note, however, that a lateral protection means can sense faults with a quite high resistance (as shown in Section IV), while, it must be borne in mind that GRi-relays only secondarily protect Li, meaning that their actual purpose is to just recognize all the faults that Pi is designed to protect against.
If GRi-relays see a 2PH/3PH fault due to a LV-fault, RFB will not trip, unless (10) holds. Also note that if a LV-fault results in IPi,max < IPi,MI, 27-element is not expected to assert.
In the case where one or more DG units are connected to Li, downstream to Pi, and the fault current injected by them is strong, (10) could also hold for a Bi-fault, "misleading" RFB into applying a time delay, instead of instantaneously tripping. For that reason, RFB is supplemented with the dotted part of Fig. 2 , which checks the direction of the fault current flowing through Pi. Specifically, based on Bi phase voltages and the superimposed phase currents at Pi ( ,, Fault direction is specified based on (5) or (6) . If a reverse fault (i.e. leading to fault current flowing towards Bi) is determined, (10) holds (indicated by a signal s) and sg, sp1, or sp2 is sent, the above case is recognized, so, instantaneous trip is issued.
E. Backup Protection of Main Line Segments and Buses
For backup protection of main line segments and buses (a lateral Li is secondarily protected by GRi-relays), a breakerfailure (BF) protection element is designed (see Fig. 2 ). The BF element ensures that if a CB fails to open, its adjacent CBs will be tripped instead. Specifically, once a relay Ri,j issues a trip order, either for main line protection (forward faults), or bus protection (reverse faults), a breaker-failure initiation (BFI) signal is simultaneously generated (BFIfi,j and BFIri,j, respectively), as shown in Fig. 2 . Then, the state of CBi,j is checked for a time period tBF, compensating for the CBi,j interrupting time. A tBF of 12 cycles is adopted here by default, which is the maximum typical BF-timer setting according to [28] . If CBi,j remains closed after tBF expires, a trip order is sent to its adjacent CBs. Note that the designed BF element discriminates between a BFI signal generated due to a forward or a reverse fault, so as to trip the proper adjacent CBs (CBfi,j and CBri,j, respectively, in Fig. 2) . Once a BFI signal is sent, an instantaneous redundant trip (re-trip) signal is also sent to CBi,j, as an attempt to avoid tripping the adjacent CBs.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The PnP scheme is tested on the 20 kV, 50 Hz, OH meshed distribution system of Fig. 4 , which is designed using realistic data received by the Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator S.A. (HEDNO S.A.), and includes both PVs and synchronous generators (SGs). The system's basic data are shown in Fig. 4 , while, a detailed description is included in [6] . Note that the total load of each lateral is shown as a single load, fed by a single distribution transformer, for illustration simplicity. PnP relays are installed at main line segments according to Section II, operating as described previously. Laterals (Li) are primarily protected by 30-T fuses (Pi), commonly applied in Greece, which are assumed existing in the system.
The system of Fig. 4 is modeled with PowerFactory 2018, used for dynamically simulating faults and extracting the voltage/current signals measured at the relays' locations. Then, these signals are processed with MATLAB, where the rest relay elements and functions are modeled and evaluated.
Due to space limitation, the relay R2,3, protecting L2,3 (along with R3,2) and B2/L2 (along with R2,1, R2,10) , is arbitrarily chosen to demonstrate the scheme's performance against a-b-c, a-b, b-c-g and a-g faults at different locations in GC/ISL system mode. An arc resistance (Rarc) of 2.5 Ω is considered for 3PH/2PH faults, which is a typical maximum Rarc in OH MV networks [22] . This is also considered as the minimum fault resistance (Rf,min) for 2PHG faults. A maximum fault resistance (Rf,max) of 100 Ω is considered for SLG/2PHG faults.
Tables II-V present the critical measurements/calculations of R2,3, referring to each algorithm-step, during the aforementioned faults at the midpoint of L2,3 (forward faults), as well as at buses B2 (reverse bus-faults) and B2.R (reverse lateral-faults). Fault positions are shown in Fig. 4 . It appears that all the faults are quickly detected by the starting functions and accurately classified (regarding 2PH/2PHG/SLG faults), while, their direction is always correctly determined. Note that in only one case in Table II (bolded) , I2,s vs. I1,s PS fails to classify the fault, which is, however, then correctly classified by V2 vs. V0 PS. As for reverse faults, RFB (see Table V ) efficiently discriminates between B2 and B2.R faults, clearing the fault instantaneously or with a proper time delay, respectively. In the latter cases, we always assume that P2 fails to blow. Just to mention, the high tTR in some cases is due to the high tP2. Note that 3PH-ground faults would be dealt with similarly to 3PH faults, while, they mainly occur due to personnel mistakes; hence, high-resistance 3PH faults are highly unlikely.
In Fig. 5a -Fig. 5c , the representative case of a-b fault at B2.R (GC mode) is chosen, to illustrate the critical operations of R2,3. Fault inception is assumed at t = 0.01 s, while, a CB with a 3-cycle interrupting time is considered. Note that only the primary phase selector is illustrated as part of Fig. 5b .
V. CONCLUSION
To provide a reliable protection solution for future OH looped/meshed active distribution systems, eliminating protection design complexity, this paper proposes a protection scheme, which relies on PnP, communication-assisted, numerical relays. The PnP relays are beforehand designed so that they do not require user-determined settings, being unaffected by system changes and independent of a particular network. As such, coordination between main line relays and between main line relays and lateral protection means is guaranteed, without needing a coordination study. Only the upload of existing lateral protection means' characteristics to the relays is required, which is, however, a simple and effortless task. Replacement of existing lateral protection means is also not needed. The latter fact, and the use of existing relay capabilities, enhance the scheme's applicability. The simulation results are very promising, as the scheme proves efficient against faults of different type, resistance, or location, no matter the existing system conditions (e.g. GC vs. ISL operation).
